

## A Cold War Crusader on an Ideological Battlefield: Andrew Eiva, the KGB, and the Soviet-Afghan War

Although he was only five years old Andrew Eiva remembers that summer evening in Brockton, Massachusetts in 1953 like it was yesterday. “I still remember the very spot in the yard where I was standing,” he recalls, “the temperature of the air, the starlit sky.” His parents “were talking about the old country [Lithuania] in various ways, reminiscences, and she [his mother] told me about my grandfather being taken away and later executed.” His grandfather was a military hero who kept Russian-led Red Army troops at bay following the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution and Civil War, 1918-1921, thereby securing self-rule for Lithuania in the interwar period. Eiva’s parents further informed their young son that the Soviets were still holding his grandmother and many of his aunts and uncles in Siberia. “Upon hearing that I was overcome with emotion, I ran up, ran over the little hilltop across the street by myself and I vowed,” he says with a chuckle, “to destroy the Soviet empire.”<sup>1</sup> Several decades later in the 1980s Eiva sought to do just that by supporting Afghan rebels, the *mujahedeen*, against Soviet troops in the Soviet-Afghan War.<sup>2</sup>

An analysis of Eiva’s role as a Cold War crusader based on material he wrote as a lobbyist, Western media accounts, and clandestine reports about him from the files of the Lithuanian KGB reveals his behind-the-scenes significance as an ideologically-driven individual outside of the confines of government helping to shape US policy during the Soviet-Afghan War, thereby hinting at a reason the Cold War ended the way that it did.<sup>3</sup> The conflict in Afghanistan,

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<sup>1</sup> Phone interview with Andrew Eiva conducted by the author 5 June 2015.

<sup>2</sup> The USSR never officially called the conflict in Afghanistan a “war,” referring to it as an “international obligation” to “help” the people of that country, but for the sake of convenience I use the term “Soviet-Afghan War.”

<sup>3</sup> As Vojtech Mastny wrote in 1996, “the old inquiry about who started the Cold War is less interesting than the new one about why it ended the way that it did,” Vojtech Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity: The Stalin Years* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996), 3-4.

the final proxy war of the Cold War, began with the Soviet invasion in December 1979 and lasted until their withdrawal in February 1989, pitting vague Western notions of “liberty” and “freedom” against an ardent Soviet belief in the liberating force of socialist “revolution”—central to their own historical identity and the events of 1917 and after—and, conversely, their antipathy toward “counterrevolutionaries”—i.e. the foes they defeated in the Civil War and thus the natural ideological enemies of the Soviets. Ideology, which Michael Hunt defines “as an interrelated set of convictions or assumptions that reduces the complexities of a particular slice of reality to easily comprehensible terms and suggests appropriate ways of dealing with that reality,” shaped policies on both sides during the Cold War.<sup>4</sup>

Ideology, moreover, informs strategy, policymakers’ way of dealing with reality as they see it. Strategy, Daniel Sargent informs, “holds the policymaking enterprise together, imbuing disconnected actions (and inactions) with coherence, direction, and purpose. Strategic thinking,” he adds, “makes assumptions about history that guide policy choices.”<sup>5</sup> As a lobbyist in the 1980s Andrew Eiva pursued strategies informed by his ideological assumptions to critique US bureaucracy and compel a stronger response to Soviet actions in Afghanistan, and he definitely had an impact. Soviet leaders were likewise driven by ideological imperatives, as Vojtech Mastny reminds us that the Soviet regime’s collapse “does not necessarily detract from the significance of its ideological underpinnings as long as it lasted.” Even in the 1980s Soviet leaders still clung to “ideological preconceptions” postulating “the ultimate victory of their system despite temporary setbacks.”<sup>6</sup> I flesh out the ideological assumptions embedded in both

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<sup>4</sup> Michael H. Hunt, *Ideology and US Foreign Policy*, 2<sup>nd</sup> ed. (Yale University Press, 2009), xi. See also Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of our Times* (Cambridge University Press, 2007).

<sup>5</sup> Daniel Sargent, *A Superpower Transformed: The Remaking of American Foreign Relations in the 1970s* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 8.

<sup>6</sup> Mastny, *The Cold War and Soviet Insecurity*, 5 and 191. On the significance of ideology for Soviet policymakers during the Cold War see James Graham Wilson, *The Triumph of Improvisation: Gorbachev’s Adaptability*,

Eiva's portrayal of his own background, actions, and worldview and the KGB's reports about him in order to reveal his role as a key figure and highlight the competing ideological frameworks of the Cold War superpowers.

Andrew Eiva is a relatively small piece of a much larger Cold War puzzle, but the puzzle is not complete without his role therein. The 1970s, Sargent informs, witnessed a breakdown of the postwar order and, by the middle of the decade, the emergence of “a new phase of disorder and improvisation” as US President Jimmy Carter shifted between prioritizing or downplaying his predecessors' policy of détente with the USSR. “The Cold War ceased to define world politics (if indeed it ever had done) and new challenges proliferated.” Conflict between the US and USSR, of course, did not end in the seventies, “but the decade confirmed the advent of a distinctive post-Cold War era, an era that took shape even as the formal estrangement between the superpowers endured.” That estrangement resurfaced with a vengeance when the USSR invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, marking the end of détente.<sup>7</sup> Afterward Carter reverted to foreign-policy concepts, i.e. containment, associated with an earlier Cold War era.<sup>8</sup> James Graham Wilson concurs, asserting that “the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan led the Carter administration to reconfigure its Cold War policies and acknowledge that détente was dead.” Carrying the thread of Cold War history into the 1980s, Wilson argues that “adaptation, improvisation, and engagement by individuals in positions of power”—namely Mikhail

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*Reagan's Engagement, and the End of the Cold War* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014), 57-58; on the importance of ideology in Soviet history more generally see Stephen Kotkin, *Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as a Civilization* (Los Angeles, 1995); and James Scanlan, *Marxism in the USSR: A Critical Survey of Current Soviet Thought* (Ithaca, 1985).

<sup>7</sup> On the end of détente see Olav Njølstad, “The Carter Legacy: Entering the Second Era of the Cold War” in ed. by Olav Njølstad, *The Last Decade of the Cold War: From Conflict to Conflict Resolution* (London: Frankl Cass, 2004); Melvyn P. Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 259-337; Dan Caldwell, “US Domestic Politics and the Demise of Détente” in ed. by Odd Arne Westad, *The Fall of Détente: Soviet-American Relations during the Carter Years* (Oslo: Scandinavian University Press, 1997), 95-117; and Artemy Kalinovsky, “Encouraging Resistance: Paul Henze, the Bennigsen school and the crisis of détente” in ed. by Michael Kemper and Artemy Kalinovsky, *Reassessing Orientalism: Interlocking Orientologies during the Cold War* (New York: Routledge, 2015), 211-232.

<sup>8</sup> Sargent, *A Superpower Transformed*, 4-11.

Gorbachev, Ronald Reagan, George Shultz, and George H. W. Bush—“ended almost a half century of cold war and the specter of a nuclear holocaust.”<sup>9</sup> These scholars’ focus on the high politics and leaders of the 1970s-1980s is, of course, understandable, but the contention here is that—at least on the Western side of the Cold War divide—even a private individual with an ideological axe to grind could play a significant role in shaping US policy, which may well tell us something about the end of that conflict.<sup>10</sup>

Eiva’s role as an advocate and lobbyist for the Afghan mujahedeen, overshadowed by such figures as US Congressman Charlie Wilson (D-Texas) and CIA agent Gust Avrakotos, both made famous by George Crile’s *Charlie Wilson’s War*, has mostly escaped the attention of scholars. Crile, who dismisses Eiva as a fringe nut case and a thorn in the side of the legitimate operation run by Wilson and Avrakotos,<sup>11</sup> notes that Eiva won the support of arch conservative Senator Gordon Humphrey (R-New Hampshire), a close friend of President Ronald Reagan, for an all-out attack on the CIA’s Afghan operation in late 1984.<sup>12</sup> Crile implies, moreover, that Congressman Wilson manipulated Eiva, noting that “on occasion, when he sensed resistance at [the] State [Department] or [the CIA], he [Wilson] would deliberately stir Eiva up,” for example having him lead the charge in 1985 to depose John McMahon, the CIA’s number two man, for his hesitancy to support the covert Afghan program.<sup>13</sup> Kyle Tadman credits Eiva with

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<sup>9</sup> Wilson, *The Triumph of Improvisation*, 48 and 2. See also John Ehrman, *The Rise of Neoconservatism: Intellectuals and Foreign Affairs, 1945–1994* (New Haven, Co.: Yale University Press, 1995), which focuses on the leading figures on the political right during the 1970s-80s.

<sup>10</sup> Kalinovsky looks at an analogous situation in his article on Paul Henze, “Encouraging Resistance,” however, Henze worked for the National Security Council and thus had a chance to directly influence US policy.

<sup>11</sup> Crile describes Eiva as “a very shabby-looking fellow” who “always had a haunted look, like a character out of a Russian novel from the days of Rasputin.” George Crile, *Charlie Wilson’s War: The Extraordinary Story of the Largest Covert Operation in History* (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2003), 327.

<sup>12</sup> On 26 December 1984 Humphrey appeared on PBS’ “MacNeil/Lehrer Newshour” and Eiva on ABC’s “Nightline” to, Crile writes, accuse “the CIA of double-dealing by providing the freedom fighters with antique and joke weaponry [while] permitting the Pakistanis to steal them blind.” Crile, *Charlie Wilson’s War*, 327-328.

<sup>13</sup> Crile, *Charlie Wilson’s War*, 329. On McMahon’s cautious approach toward Afghanistan see also Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10, 2001* (New York: Penguin Books, 2004), 90-91 and 101.

influencing US policy toward the Soviet-Afghan War, especially his role in the passage of a resolution sponsored by Massachusetts Senator Paul Tsongas (D), which stalled for over two years before Congress passed it in October 1984. The Tsongas Resolution took up Eiva's cause directly by changing the US goal in Afghanistan from bleeding the Soviets into submission to winning the war by killing as many Soviet troops as possible and forcing their ouster from the country.<sup>14</sup> Tadman concludes that the impact of Eiva and "his organization," the Federal American Afghan Action (FAAA), "on the history of U.S. foreign-policy towards the war has been widely overlooked and should have warranted considerably more attention than they received from those who have written about this topic to date."<sup>15</sup>

### **Constructing Andrew Eiva**

In his lobbyist materials Andrew Eiva projects an image of himself to Cold War policymakers in the US, and in their reports the KGB's agents repackage that image in their own ideological wrapping. A child of the Cold War while it was still in its own infancy, Andrius Linas Eitavicius (later Americanized to Andrew Eiva) joined the world 26 October 1948 in Bonn, West Germany. The Cold War and its attitudes, ideologies, and conflicts defined his generation on both sides of the divide, but, as will become clear, few were born as directly into the fray. Eiva's lobbying group, the aforementioned FAAA, published his August 1984 remarks to the Republican Platform Committee's National Security Subcommittee in Dallas, Texas, which included a lot of autobiographical information. The FAAA circulated the remarks along with a copy of a

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<sup>14</sup> Coll quotes the Resolution in full, "It would be indefensible to provide the freedom fighters with only enough aid to fight and die, but not enough to advance their cause of freedom," but does not call it the Tsongas Resolution and credits Wilson with its passage through Congress. Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 91-92.

<sup>15</sup> Kyle David Richard Tadman, "The Making of U. S. Foreign-Policy During the Soviet-Afghan War," Unpublished Master's Thesis, Department of History, Western Illinois University, May 2012, available at [http://www.academic.edu/3785229/\\_The\\_Making\\_of\\_U.S.\\_Foreign\\_Policy\\_During\\_the\\_Soviet\\_Afghan\\_War\\_unpublished\\_Thesis\\_M.A.\\_History](http://www.academic.edu/3785229/_The_Making_of_U.S._Foreign_Policy_During_the_Soviet_Afghan_War_unpublished_Thesis_M.A._History) (accessed 1 April 2015), 147 and 189.

favorable May 1983 *New York Times* piece about Eiva by Leslie Gelb.<sup>16</sup> A short biography included with his remarks to the National Security Subcommittee notes that Eiva was born in a refugee camp in Bonn to “parents who fled communism” and came to the US in 1949.<sup>17</sup> The sketch also identifies Eiva as the grandson of “the youngest general in Lithuanian history,” Kazimieras Ladyga, “who drove the Bolsheviks out of Lithuania in 1918 and became the chief of staff of the armed forces of independent Lithuania.”<sup>18</sup> Obviously his grandfather and Lithuanian background are important aspects of Eiva’s self-identity. Gelb adds that when Soviet troops occupied Lithuania in 1940, “according to Mr. Eiva,” they arrested General Ladyga, tortured and executed him.<sup>19</sup> Eiva never actually knew his grandfather but one senses the larger-than-life presence looming in the background of his grandson’s subsequent career as an ardent anti-Soviet crusader.

Eiva’s early years coincided with the Soviet annihilation of Lithuania’s guerrilla movement, “which ‘enjoyed’ CIA support,” he ironically told his 1984 Republican Party audience, and had failed miserably by the time Eiva was five in 1953. “At an age when most children were learning to read,” he explains, “I was learning about fouled up CIA bundle drops to Lithuanian guerrillas around the dinner table.”<sup>20</sup> In 1985 Eiva told High School students in Pennsylvania he was “puzzled” about the inadequate aid the US supplied Lithuanian rebels after World War II. “If people are willing to fight for freedom,” he asked rhetorically, “why won’t

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<sup>16</sup> Leslie Gelb, “From One Kind of Army to Another,” *New York Times*, 25 May 1983. Crile describes Gelb’s piece as “a breakthrough for the crusader” that “gave Eiva all the legitimacy he needed.” Crile, *Charlie Wilson’s War*, 328.

<sup>17</sup> “Remarks of Andrew Eiva to the Republican Platform Committee’s National Security Subcommittee,” Dallas, Texas, 13 August 1984, available at [http://www.jezail.org/03\\_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva\\_1.pdf](http://www.jezail.org/03_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva_1.pdf) (accessed 31 March 2015), 13.

<sup>18</sup> “Remarks of Andrew Eiva,” 13.

<sup>19</sup> Gelb, “From One Kind of Army to Another.”

<sup>20</sup> “Remarks of Andrew Eiva,” 3.

America support them?”<sup>21</sup> Barry Goldwater’s pamphlet “Why Not Victory?” inspired sixteen year-old Eiva in 1964, who, bucking the trend of his generation, spent the next three years organizing in support of the Vietnam War, “founding and leading the ‘Victory in Vietnam Committee’” on his campus. “We held the Students for a Democratic Society at bay for an entire year while the administration frittered away American blood, money, prestige, andy [sic] my efforts in a no-win defensive war in Vietnam.”<sup>22</sup> He transferred to West Point, graduating in 1972 as a master parachutist and linguist. “I commanded paratroopers in the 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne Division,” he informed his 1984 Republican audience, “and led a Special Forces ‘green beret’ detachment specializing in Soviet weapons, tactics, and languages.”

With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979 Eiva left the army, “conducted my own assessment of the Afghan War” and “decided our bureaucrats were on their way to another ‘no-win’ scenario.” He spent the next several years educating himself on CIA covert operations “in Afghanistan and elsewhere, training guerrillas, and organizing a program to encourage larger Soviet defections in Afghanistan.”<sup>23</sup> As a lobbyist beginning in 1983 Eiva sought to prove his legitimacy to potential donors and politicians on both sides of the aisle.<sup>24</sup> The biographical sketch at the end of the remarks elucidates that Eiva was a boxing champion at West Point,<sup>25</sup> while a separate flier notes that he is “conversant in Lithuanian, German, Dari, and Russian,” which, it adds parenthetically, he “learned from study of Russian bible [sic] and conversations with Soviet prisoners while interned in jail in Pakistan.”<sup>26</sup> Later FAAA lobbyist materials have

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<sup>21</sup> Carole McNall, “Afghan Aid Issue Spreads to Grassroots America,” *Olean Times*, 24 April 1985, available at [http://www.jezail.org/03\\_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva\\_5.pdf](http://www.jezail.org/03_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva_5.pdf) (accessed 31 March 2015), 35.

<sup>22</sup> “Remarks of Andrew Eiva,” 3. Eiva attended the University of Massachusetts.

<sup>23</sup> “Remarks of Andrew Eiva,” 3.

<sup>24</sup> As discussed below a conservative Mormon operation, “Free the Eagle,” funded Eiva’s lobbyist activities.

<sup>25</sup> “Remarks of Andrew Eiva,” 13.

<sup>26</sup> Information sheet for the “Free Afghanistan Alliance,” available at [http://www.jezail.org/03\\_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva\\_2.pdf](http://www.jezail.org/03_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva_2.pdf) (accessed 31 March 2015), 7. This material includes a copy of his senior-year West Point yearbook page, on which above the picture of a smiling Eiva the text reads, “After a stormy plebe year, Andy

less biographical information—presumably Eiva’s *bona fides* had already been established—but a newsletter recapping the organization’s activities in 1985 includes a local article from April in Pennsylvania’s *Olean Times* about his talk to students that rehashes the main themes of his personal narrative, i.e. that his involvement with Afghanistan stemmed from his childhood as “the son of Lithuanians driven from their homeland.”<sup>27</sup>

Judging from their reports in the Lithuanian archives the KGB clearly saw Eiva as an important foe and, after he first appeared on their radar in 1987, watched him and his organization closely. Based on Eiva’s own materials, the KGB’s reports repeat the same formulaic, ever-briefer biographical sketch of Eiva, albeit in a very different language (both literally and ideologically). The KGB tries to surmise this man’s relationship to the CIA, thinking at least initially that he worked for the Agency despite his record of constantly berating its effort in Afghanistan, which they knew about from the outset. There are five files in the Lithuanian KGB archive about Eiva during the final stages of the Afghan war, mostly correspondence between local officials and their superiors in Moscow. However, the earliest memo, dated March 1987, apparently originated as an internal document of the Lithuanian KGB because it is on their letterhead and, unlike the other reports, is not addressed to anyone. Marked “Secret” and entitled “On the Actions Abroad of Lithuanian Nationalists in Support of the Afghan Enemies (*dushmanov*),” the memo notes that the Lithuanian KGB has information about US “special services” (*spetssluzhbie*), namely the CIA and US military agencies, “instigating propaganda to gain the moral support of American society, including [Lithuanian] émigrés, to

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became known as a man who always won in the end,” noting his “long streak of boxing victories,” which proves the claim made in his biographical sketch, and ending with: “A man who fights for what he believes, he will be heard from again,” available at [http://www.jezail.org/03\\_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva\\_2.pdf](http://www.jezail.org/03_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva_2.pdf) (accessed 31 March 2015), 13.

<sup>27</sup> McNall, “Afghan Aid Issue Spreads to Grassroots America.”



aid Afghan counterrevolutionaries.”<sup>28</sup> The only example it gives is Eiva, thus pegging him as a spy and a “counterrevolutionary.” The brief memo summarizes Eiva’s biography accordingly:

A former US Army Captain who served in the “green berets, [sic] second-generation Lithuanian emigrant Andrius L. Eiva (Eivitis) lectures to groups of Lithuanians in the US and Canada with an anti-Soviet position about the situation in Afghanistan, about the struggle of counterrevolutionaries against the legal government of that country, criticizes the CIA and other American agencies for their lack of financial and military support for that struggle.<sup>29</sup>

To impress his audiences, the memo continues, Eiva presents “either some Afghan bandit leaders or some disabled Afghan children.”<sup>30</sup> It seems likely from this (and similar comments in other reports) that a KGB agent (or agents) in the US attended these meetings and reported to Vilnius on Eiva’s activities. The brief document, signed by Lithuania’s long-serving KGB Chairman Iu. Iu. Petkiavichius, ends by stating “we are collecting data on A. Eiva” to “possibly compromise him,” or, in other words, spread bad rumors and discrediting information about him.<sup>31</sup>

The memo piqued Moscow’s interest and central KGB leaders requested additional information from Vilnius in May 1987: “we are interested in finding out more about the FAAA (office in Washington), created for the mobilization of social support for the Afghan counterrevolutionaries.”<sup>32</sup> The request identifies Eiva as Executive Director of FAAA and informs that he is “approximately 42 years old” (he was actually 38), “served in the Green Berets from 1972-1980, since 1980 is a retired captain, has Lithuanian roots, his grandfather is General Ladyga (1926-27 head of the armed forces of Bourgeois Lithuania), has ties with the CIA.”<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> LSA, K-35-2-456, l. 326.

<sup>29</sup> LSA, K-35-2-456, l. 326; see l. 315. The report misspells Eiva’s full Lithuanian name Eitavicius.

<sup>30</sup> LSA, K-35-2-456, l. 326. Eiva said in a phone interview conducted by the author 5 June 2015 that Afghan children wounded in the war accompanied him at a talk he gave in New York.

<sup>31</sup> LSA, K-35-2-456, l. 327. Petkiavichius served as Chairman of the Lithuanian KGB from 1967-May 1987. Michael Parrish, *Soviet Security and Intelligence Organizations, 1917-1990: A Biographical Dictionary and Review of Literature in English* (Westport, CT: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1992), 322.

<sup>32</sup> LSA, K-35-2-456, l. 316. Specifically, Deputy Chief A. K. Poliakov of the central KGB in Moscow wrote to Colonel V. L. Karinauskas in the Vilnius branch.

<sup>33</sup> LSA, K-35-2-456, l. 316.

Vilnius responded several weeks later. “Considering that A. Eiva has Lithuanian roots,” their response states, “we are collecting all available information about him to possibly discredit him in the eyes of the [Lithuanian] émigré community,” reiterating the point made in the original memo and revealing an important KGB tactic—to “compromise” and “discredit” perceived threats like Eiva.<sup>34</sup> The document also clarifies *how* the KGB will gather information on Eiva: “Our agent ‘Karalius’ (linked to overseas operations in New York) will study A. Eiva, and the task of studying Eiva and the activities of FAAA will be given to the deeply-embedded sources ‘Vil’niai,’ ‘Sharunas,’ ‘Villi,’ ‘Dmitrii.’”<sup>35</sup> A month later a subsequent report repeats the same basic information on Eiva, including the mistaken date of birth, adding that “in 1980 he retired from military service, ostensibly because ‘service in the army interfered with his ability to express his political point of view.’” It is not clear why the latter part of this sentence is set off in quotation marks as if to suggest that it is a direct quote (that specific point does not originate from any of Eiva’s written materials examined for this study).<sup>36</sup> The account further notes Eiva’s “Lithuanian roots,” adding that “according to [Lithuanian] emigrant circles, he is the grandson of General Ladyga, head of the armed forces in bourgeois Lithuania in 1926-27 (who was ostensibly convicted in 1941 by a Soviet court).”<sup>37</sup>

The KGB deconstructs and then *reconstructs* Eiva’s identity based on his own personal narrative and their own ideological assumptions. The KGB sees his grandfather not as the commander of the armed forces of “independent Lithuania” but of “bourgeois Lithuania,” a term

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<sup>34</sup> LSA, K-35-2-456, ll. 314-315. The response is dated 25 June 1987. Similarly, according to Crile, “The CIA came to loathe Andrew Eiva, and it appears that officers suggested more than once to congressmen and staffers that Eiva might be a Bulgarian or East German agent,” *Charlie Wilson’s War*, 327.

<sup>35</sup> LSA, K-35-2-456, ll. 314-315.

<sup>36</sup> LSA, K-35-2-456, l. 322. This report was from Colonel Ye. K. Elentsev of the Moscow KGB office to Karinauskas.

<sup>37</sup> LSA, K-35-2-456, l. 322.

with a pejorative ideological connotation for functionaries of the KGB.<sup>38</sup> In addition, use of the word “ostensibly” (*yakoby*) in two cases, regarding his grandfather’s conviction by a Soviet court and also Eiva’s claim to have quit the military because it did not allow him to freely express his political beliefs, casts doubt on Eiva’s version of events, signifying an awareness on the part of the KGB author that this is all just a projection of Eiva’s own image based on information primarily from him (information that should not be taken at face value). The report, moreover, apparently relies on eyewitness testimony from (an) agent(s) on the ground in the US and denotes Eiva’s “anti-Soviet position” about Afghanistan, illuminating the Soviet perspective that it is “the struggle of counterrevolutionaries against the legal government of that country,” a depiction that essentially writes Soviet troops and their extensive role in the conflict out of the picture.<sup>39</sup> The Soviets did not refer to their involvement in Afghanistan as a “war” but rather as an “international obligation,” and KGB ideologues fail to acknowledge in these documents either that Afghanistan’s communist government would almost certainly fail without Soviet support, or that they were fighting a losing battle—like the US in Vietnam before them the Soviets were trapped in an unwinnable war they could not easily extricate themselves from.<sup>40</sup>

### **A Cold War Crusader in Action**

Andrew Eiva was a *very* busy man in the 1980s fighting for a cause he believed in deeply since his early childhood: the rollback of communism and defeat of the USSR. He travelled often in the early stages of the war to Pakistan and Afghanistan before settling into a Washington D. C.

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<sup>38</sup> “Independent” from a Western perspective equals “bourgeois” from a Soviet point of view, which sees “socialism” as the rule of “the masses” rather than of the capitalist “bourgeois” elite, and therefore as superior and more truly independent.

<sup>39</sup> LSA, K-35-2-456, l. 322.

<sup>40</sup> See Artemy Kalinovsky, *A Long Goodbye: The Soviet Withdrawal From Afghanistan* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2011).

office as a lobbyist in 1983.<sup>41</sup> According to Crile “a particularly extreme, right-wing Mormon operation, Free the Eagle,” made this transition for Eiva possible when it “decided to put him on the payroll as an Afghan lobbyist.”<sup>42</sup> Thereafter Eiva travelled mainly within the US and Canada giving talks to foreign-policy specialists, students, Lithuanian émigrés, and others (including apparently KGB spies), while also producing literature intended to sway politicians and donors and gain the attention of members of the media. “Even though we [FAAA] were founded only last year,” he told his August 1984 GOP audience, “we have already been instrumental in the bipartisan introduction in both houses of Congress of legislation calling for effective aid to the Afghans, the first American legislation ever calling for support of a guerrilla movement.”<sup>43</sup> Between trips to the region, Eiva explains, he approached Senator Paul Tsongas from his home state of Massachusetts and encouraged him “to take the lead in addressing the key issue: ‘it would be indefensible to give the Afghans only enough to fight and die but not enough to advance their cause to freedom.’”<sup>44</sup>

Eiva also sought to free Soviet POWs held by the mujahedeen and convince them to defect to the west. In one flier he declares himself “coordinator” of “‘Operation Bastille,’ a project sponsored by international human rights organizations under the leadership of Russian dissident Vladimir Bukovskii [to protect] the lives of Soviet prisoners and defectors in Afghanistan.”<sup>45</sup> Crile derides this effort as part of “a year [1985] of right-wing craziness,” recounting the program mostly through the colorful language of CIA agent Gust Avrakotos.

Based on Vlasov’s army in World War II, a Nazi program to recruit Soviet soldiers to form an

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<sup>41</sup> Eiva accompanied rebels “in Afghanistan four times by 1983” according to one of his fliers, [http://www.jezail.org/03\\_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva\\_1.pdf](http://www.jezail.org/03_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva_1.pdf) (accessed 17 April 2015), 13.

<sup>42</sup> Crile claims that the leader of Free the Eagle, Neil Blair, “believed that Eiva could rally conservatives who felt that the CIA” was “dominated by people of suspect patriotism.” Crile, *Charlie Wilson’s War*, 328.

<sup>43</sup> “Remarks of Andrew Eiva,” 1.

<sup>44</sup> “Remarks of Andrew Eiva,” 2.

<sup>45</sup> “Free Afghanistan Alliance” based in Boston, Massachusetts (undated), available at [http://www.jezail.org/03\\_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva\\_2.pdf](http://www.jezail.org/03_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva_2.pdf) (accessed 31 March 2015), 5.

anti-Stalinist army, the idea was to set up loudspeakers in the mountains of Afghanistan and encourage Soviet troops to defect to the mujahedeen and the west. “Andrew Eiva,” writes Crile, “not surprisingly, was deeply involved in this effort. He had gone to Pakistan in the early 1980s trying to find Russian prisoners to demonstrate how effective such a policy could be, but he had learned that the mujahedeen did not have much interest in keeping prisoners alive.”<sup>46</sup> Others pushing the idea included Richard Perle at the Pentagon, National Security Council staffer Walt Raymond, and Colonel Oliver North, soon to gain infamy through the Iran-Contra Affair.<sup>47</sup> They told Avrakotos that they wanted the CIA to spend millions on this program, hoping that as many as ten thousand Soviet troops might defect.<sup>48</sup> Avrakotos, however, dismissed the plan as the delusion of “cuckoos of the far right.”

“What Russian in his right mind would defect to those fuckers all armed to the teeth?” Avrakotos said in frustration. “To begin with, anyone defecting to the *Dushman* [mujahedeen] would have to be a crook, a thief, or someone who wanted to get cornholed every day, because nine out of ten prisoners were dead within twenty-four hours and they were always turned into concubines by the mujahedeen.”

Avrakotos reportedly called North and Perle “idiots” and told Raymond he was “irrelevant”; needless to say Avrakotos remembers the program as a failure.<sup>49</sup>

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<sup>46</sup> Coll cites a 1981 interview with Afghan mujahedeen commander Ahmed Shah Massoud explaining why there were no Soviet POWs in his jails: “Hatred for the Russians is just too great,” Massoud said. “Many mujahedeen have lost their families or homes through communist terror. Their first reaction when coming across a Russian is to kill him.” Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 117. He cites Edward Girardet, *Christian Science Monitor*, September 24, 1981.

<sup>47</sup> The covert program to sell weapons to Iran despite an arms embargo against that country in exchange for negotiating the release of US hostages held by Iran’s ally Hezbollah in Lebanon. The operation then sent money from the arms sales to Iran to the contra rebels in Nicaragua fighting against that country’s communist Sandinista government, despite a law (the Boland Amendment) prohibiting any US support to the contras. The scandal began due to a media report in a Lebanese newspaper on 3 November 1986.

<sup>48</sup> Crile, *Charlie Wilson’s War*, 331-332.

<sup>49</sup> For Avrakotos’ retelling of the effort see Crile, *Charlie Wilson’s War*, 333-334. Western media reports between 1982-1984 estimate up to 300 Soviet POWs at most in captivity with the mujahedeen. For a sampling of such reports see “Afghans Free Two Soviet Soldiers,” *The Washington Times*, 26 November 1982; Edward Girardet, “Red Cross Acts as Middleman in Afghanistan POW Deals,” *The Christian Science Monitor*, 28 December 1982; John Darnton, “Swiss Ponder Future Status of 8 Russians,” *New York Times*, 26 June 1983, 13.

In his lobbyist materials Eiva paints a more positive portrait of “Operation Bastille”—a term not evoked by Crile, Avrakotos, or any of the reporters at the time—claiming in one (undated) flier that the program “accounted for 46 live Soviets in eighteen months.”<sup>50</sup> In the 1983 *New York Times* piece Eiva reportedly told Gelb that “the Russian soldiers have no Canada and Sweden to defect to, so the goal was to develop one, to train the Afghans to do this.” Three years later Eiva cited as a credential on his lobbyist materials the “development and implementation of Operation Bastille, the safeguarding of live Soviets in Afghan hands to encourage larger-scale defections and desertions, resulting in the increase of live Soviet prisoners from zero to over two hundred.”<sup>51</sup> This program is linked, moreover, to a mysterious spell of about two months in late 1982 that Eiva spent in a Pakistani jail, which Gelb also mentions, asserting that Eiva was jailed “for meddling.”<sup>52</sup> In a September 1984 issue of the FAAA newsletter Eiva called upon “concerned Americans” to pressure Congress to bring the Tsongas Resolution to a vote before the upcoming November elections, asserting that during the lame duck session in the Senate two years earlier “the CIA’s Pakistan secret service friends kidnapped me and kept me incommunicado in jail in Pakistan while the bureaucrats combined with Senator [Charles ‘Mac’] Mathias [R-Maryland] to kill the legislation in spite of 99 (!) Senate cosponsors. Your vigilance,” he adds, “will prevent equivalent chicanery from being successful” in 1984.<sup>53</sup> In other words, Eiva posits that his internment in Pakistan stemmed from a conspiracy involving

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<sup>50</sup> “Free Afghanistan Alliance” (undated), available at [http://www.jezail.org/03\\_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva\\_2.pdf](http://www.jezail.org/03_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva_2.pdf) (accessed 31 March 2015), 6.

<sup>51</sup> “Credentials of AAEF Director Andrew Eiva,” available at [http://www.jezail.org/03\\_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva\\_7.pdf](http://www.jezail.org/03_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva_7.pdf) (accessed 31 March 2015), 9.

<sup>52</sup> Gelb, “From One Kind of Army to Another.” This was when, as noted above, he allegedly learned Russian from “conversations with Soviet prisoners.”

<sup>53</sup> “Federation for American Afghan Action” material, available at [http://www.jezail.org/03\\_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva\\_3.pdf](http://www.jezail.org/03_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva_3.pdf) (accessed 31 March 2015), 26 and 29. Exclamation point in the original.

the CIA and the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) to make sure he did not get the Tsongas resolution passed through the lame duck Congress.<sup>54</sup>

Congress passed the Tsongas Resolution 3 October 1984, allowing Eiva to turn his attention to another issue: the alleged hesitancy of the CIA's number two man, John McMahon, to support the Afghan rebels. As Crile puts it, nothing "in the Agency's history" compared to the "unprecedented public attack launched from the Right" on McMahon and the "moving force was Andrew Eiva," who informed Crile that he "discovered" this "'enemy' of the Afghans" on 20 May 1985, "a date he [Eiva] remembers vividly." Vince Cannistaro, a National Security Council staffer and former CIA operative, reportedly told Eiva that "the real enemy" of the freedom fighters is McMahon, who "had urged the Senate not to pass the Tsongas resolution."<sup>55</sup> Afterward, Crile informs, on "Nightline" Eiva "specifically accused McMahon of misleading Congress" about the Afghans "being adequately armed" in "the first of a vicious series of public attacks," the sum of which suggested that McMahon's record on this issue "verged on treason."<sup>56</sup> An issue of the FAAA newsletter published the same day as Eiva's meeting with Cannistaro quotes Dr. Jack Wheeler's testimony before a Congressional subcommittee weeks earlier. Wheeler, director of the Freedom Research Foundation who "travelled extensively with the resistance inside Afghanistan," accused the CIA of planting a story in *Time* magazine, "Caravans on Moonless Nights," about an alleged CIA "invisible pipeline" of weapons through southeastern Afghanistan. Rebel commanders in the area, however, told Wheeler that "no such thing existed." The story, Eiva elaborates, constitutes "a hoax planted by the CIA" as part of a

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<sup>54</sup> Eiva reiterated this theory in a phone interview conducted by the author 5 June 2015, citing Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, one of the main mujahedeen commanders, who reportedly informed Eiva that "the CIA had told the Pakistanis to hold me."

<sup>55</sup> Crile, *Charlie Wilson's War*, 224. Coll quotes Thomas Twetten, one of McMahon's senior colleagues in the CIA, as saying "There was a concern between what I call the sensible bureaucrats, having been one of them, and the rabid right," Coll *Ghost Wars*, 90.

<sup>56</sup> Crile, *Charlie Wilson's War*, 335.

“disinformation campaign to cover up the scandal of the CIA’s spending scores upon scores of taxpayers’ dollars to little effect.” He identifies McMahon as “the chief architect of the CIA’s dual policy of covering up its failures in Afghanistan and hindering corrective legislation.”<sup>57</sup>

In September 1985 Eiva wrote to recipients of the FAAA’s newsletter to alert them that “the fate of the Afghans may be in the hands of faceless federal employees who seem to lack any excitement about a win in Afghanistan.” In case there was any doubt about whom he was talking, the letter specifies that McMahon “lobbied hard against our legislation [the Tsongas Resolution] in 1984” but lost, and also “personally killed at least two innovative policies being pushed by the White House to step up US support for the Afghans.” If McMahon fails to “get on the right side of this issue,” Eiva writes, “he should go, to be replaced by someone who will carry out congressional policy in this matter.”<sup>58</sup> At the time Eiva advocated sending Stinger missiles to the Afghan rebels, which is probably one of the two policies he is accusing McMahon of killing (the other most likely being “Operation Bastille”), although that is not entirely clear. Elsewhere Eiva accuses McMahon of defending “current CIA air defense weapons to the Afghans”—i.e. *instead of* Stinger missiles—“in misleading secret briefings to elected officials.” It is unclear how Eiva knew about such “secret” information, but in one of his newsletters he lists as a credential his “unique access to classified information through intelligence committees, media, and the bureaucracies dealing with on-going operations to support resistance movements.”<sup>59</sup> His attacks on McMahon were, in short, manifold and unrelenting. “Continued

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<sup>57</sup> “Afghan Update,” “House Hearings Expose CIA ‘Hoax,’” 20 May 1985, at [http://www.jezail.org/03\\_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva\\_5.pdf](http://www.jezail.org/03_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva_5.pdf) (accessed 29 May 2015), 32.

<sup>58</sup> “American Afghan Education Fund” letter, available at [http://www.jezail.org/03\\_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva\\_5.pdf](http://www.jezail.org/03_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva_5.pdf) (accessed 29 May 2015), 18.

<sup>59</sup> “Credentials,” available at [http://www.jezail.org/03\\_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva\\_7.pdf](http://www.jezail.org/03_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva_7.pdf) (accessed 29 May 2015), 9.



White House and Congressional toleration of his [McMahon's] version" of events in Afghanistan, Eiva contends, "will insure the Soviet destruction of Afghanistan."<sup>60</sup>

In official Soviet parlance, in other words, Eiva identifies the main problem of US policies abroad as "*bureaucratism*" as seen in his description of Vietnam as a "no-win defensive war"; his ironic comments about Lithuanian rebels "enjoying CIA help" such as "fouled up CIA bundle drops"; and his assessment of the Soviet-Afghan War as an example of US bureaucrats "on their way to another 'no-win' scenario."<sup>61</sup> For Eiva, moreover, the personification of "bureaucratism" was John McMahon, who resigned from his position in early March 1986. The *Los Angeles Times* reported that President Reagan accepted his resignation "with regret," noting that the fifty-six-year-old McMahon, who had been in the position for four years, cited "personal reasons" for his decision to step down. "There was no indication," the report adds, "that the resignation signaled a widespread shake-up in the CIA's highest ranks, although McMahon had clashed with Capitol Hill conservatives who considered him less than zealous in his support of aid to guerrilla fighters in Afghanistan and Nicaragua."<sup>62</sup> Eiva was gleeful. For him the removal of McMahon, "the top bureaucratic foe of aid to freedom fighters," cleared the way for improved US support to anti-communist guerrillas around the globe. "The preliminary decision to send two hundred Stingers to Afghanistan and Angola resulted directly from McMahon's removal," he wrote later that year, "taking place in the same week."<sup>63</sup> Thereafter Eiva lists as one of his

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<sup>60</sup> "Afghan Update," "Commentary," 30 September 1985, available at [http://www.jezail.org/03\\_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva\\_5.pdf](http://www.jezail.org/03_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva_5.pdf) (accessed 29 May 2015), 12. For additional criticisms of McMahon by Eiva see also "Afghan Update," "Byrd Corners Gorbachev on Afghanistan," 30 September 1985, available at [http://www.jezail.org/03\\_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva\\_5.pdf](http://www.jezail.org/03_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva_5.pdf) (accessed 29 May 2015), 13.

<sup>61</sup> "Remarks of Andrew Eiva," 3.

<sup>62</sup> "No. 2 CIA Man Quits Post; No Shake-Up Seen," *Los Angeles Times*, 5 March 1986.

<sup>63</sup> "The Reagan Doctrine—From Rhetoric to Reality: What is Needed in 1986," (undated), by Andrew Eiva and Neil Blair, available at [http://www.jezail.org/03\\_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva\\_7.pdf](http://www.jezail.org/03_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva_7.pdf) (accessed 29 May 2015), 2.

“credentials” in his lobbying material “identifying John McMahon as the key blockage to effective aid to the freedom fighters and initiating the campaign for his removal.”<sup>64</sup>

Eiva was also involved with a number of other initiatives to support the mujahedeen, including as noted promoting the introduction of Stinger missiles to rebel forces.<sup>65</sup> In 1986 he lists as another “credential” “identifying the specific problems in CIA air defense weapons for the Afghans culminating in the decision to provide Stingers,”<sup>66</sup> and a *Washington Post* article three years later credits Eiva with making the “first public call” in the FAAA newsletter “for the advanced-technology weapon to go to the guerrillas.”<sup>67</sup> Eiva was also heavily involved in setting up radio stations in Afghanistan “to offset the barrage of communist controlled information flooding the Afghan airways.”<sup>68</sup> On other matters Eiva’s efforts were less successful. For example, due to the corruption and waste involved he lobbied to bypass the Pakistani ISI as the main supply channel to the mujahedeen by opening an “air bridge” to supply them directly, but this never occurred.<sup>69</sup> Also, despite some success (more than perhaps Avrakotos allows for), Eiva’s efforts (as well as those of others) to convince Soviet POWs to defect to the west in large

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<sup>64</sup> “Credentials,” available at [http://www.jezail.org/03\\_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva\\_7.pdf](http://www.jezail.org/03_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva_7.pdf) (accessed 29 May 2015), 9.

<sup>65</sup> On Eiva’s promotion of Stingers see “Afghan Update,” available at [http://www.jezail.org/03\\_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva\\_5.pdf](http://www.jezail.org/03_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva_5.pdf) (accessed 29 May 2015), 53. On the introduction of Stinger missiles and their impact see Alan J. Kuperman, “The Stinger Missile and U.S. Intervention in Afghanistan,” *Political Science Quarterly*, 114, (Summer 1999), 219-263.

<sup>66</sup> “Credentials,” available at [http://www.jezail.org/03\\_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva\\_7.pdf](http://www.jezail.org/03_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva_7.pdf) (accessed 29 May 2015), 9.

<sup>67</sup> David B. Ottaway, “Groups Fostered Atmosphere Conducive to Giving Rebels Modern Weapons,” *Washington Post*, 12 February 1989. For that issue of the FAAA newsletter “Afghan Update,” 26 July 1985 see [http://www.jezail.org/03\\_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva\\_5.pdf](http://www.jezail.org/03_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva_5.pdf) (accessed 29 May 2015), 27. Ottaway writes that Eiva challenged the administration to send 1,000 Stingers to Afghanistan.

<sup>68</sup> “FM Broadcasting Stations,” available at [http://www.jezail.org/03\\_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva\\_4.pdf](http://www.jezail.org/03_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva_4.pdf) (accessed 29 May 2015), 21.

<sup>69</sup> Eiva cited allied air drops of weapons and ammunition to Marshall Josip Tito’s partisans in Yugoslavia during World War II as a model. “Yugoslav Example: Airdrops and Direct Training,” available at [http://www.jezail.org/03\\_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva\\_5.pdf](http://www.jezail.org/03_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva_5.pdf) (accessed 29 May 2015), 59. On Eiva’s proposal for an “air bridge” see also “Afghan Update,” “Commentary,” 6 August 1986, available at [http://www.jezail.org/03\\_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva\\_5.pdf](http://www.jezail.org/03_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva_5.pdf) (accessed 29 May 2015), 63. Coll states that at an Interagency meeting in the spring of 1985 Fred Ikle suggested using air drops to supply the mujahedeen and someone at the meeting asked, “What if the Russians begin shooting down the U.S. planes and ignite World War III?” Coll, *Ghost Wars*, 128.

numbers ultimately did not amount to much.<sup>70</sup> On the other hand, Eiva succeeded (with the help of Senator Humphrey) in getting the communist Democratic Republic of Afghanistan's "Most Favored Nation" trading status with the US revoked in February 1986<sup>71</sup> and assisted the organization "American Aid to Afghans" to send boots,<sup>72</sup> clothing,<sup>73</sup> doctors, medical supplies,<sup>74</sup> mine detectors and other items to the rebels.<sup>75</sup>

Based on the two most detailed KGB accounts about Eiva, both penned in June 1987 and imbued with ideological meaning, its spies definitely received the FAAA newsletter, attended meetings where Eiva spoke, and probably even infiltrated the lobbyist's office. One of the reports informs that in April "Eiva met with representatives of 'The American Union of Lithuanian Youth' to encourage Americans of Lithuanian origin to pressure the US Congress to increase its financial support and military aid to the 'band of enemies'" in Afghanistan.<sup>76</sup> "Eiva's activities," this report expounds, "are supported by Russian dissident V. Bukovskii," while he also "draws support from the powerful lobbyist group 'Free the Eagle.'" It is unclear how the KGB discovered such details, either by bugging Eiva's office or in conversation with him or possibly both. The report further notes that Eiva has friends in high places such as "Senators Gordon Humphrey, Bill Bradley [D-New Jersey], and Robert Dole [R-Kansas]." Eiva and the other FAAA leaders, moreover, "constantly travel to the camps of rebel groups in Pakistan and Afghanistan, participate in the military training of the enemy, find out what the

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<sup>70</sup> Eiva in a phone interview conducted by the author 5 June 2015 estimates that "Operation Bastille" was "ten percent success, ninety percent failure," emphasizing that they saved the lives of 313 Soviet prisoners.

<sup>71</sup> "Afghan Update: Reagan Finally Revokes Afghan Regime's Most Favored Trade Status," "Commentary," available at [http://www.jezail.org/03\\_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva\\_5.pdf](http://www.jezail.org/03_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva_5.pdf) (accessed 29 May 2015), 50.

<sup>72</sup> "Afghan Update," "6000 Boots for Afghans," 26 July 1985, available at [http://www.jezail.org/03\\_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva\\_5.pdf](http://www.jezail.org/03_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva_5.pdf) (accessed 29 May 2015), 29.

<sup>73</sup> "Clothing for Transport," available at [http://www.jezail.org/03\\_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva\\_4.pdf](http://www.jezail.org/03_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva_4.pdf) (accessed 29 May 2015), 22.

<sup>74</sup> "Afghan Update," "Oregon Group Now Deploying American Doctors to Afghanistan," 16 September 1985, available at [http://www.jezail.org/03\\_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva\\_5.pdf](http://www.jezail.org/03_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva_5.pdf) (accessed 29 May 2015), 22.

<sup>75</sup> "Afghan Update," "Rotary Club Buys Mine Detectors for Afghans," available at [http://www.jezail.org/03\\_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva\\_5.pdf](http://www.jezail.org/03_Eiva-FAAA/Eiva_5.pdf) (accessed 29 May 2015), 36.

<sup>76</sup> LSA, K-35-2-456, l. 316. This was the meeting with wounded Afghan children.

rebel groups need and then pressure the US administration to increase appropriations to the Afghan rebels, which ostensibly they see as not being anywhere near enough at the current time.” For example, FAAA demands that “an increase of 1,000 stinger missiles per year be sent to the rebels.”<sup>77</sup>

The reports declare that Eiva personally knows Afghan rebel commanders, “helps finance ‘Radio Free Afghanistan,’” and spent time in a Pakistani jail, though the KGB does not believe his explanation of that incident.<sup>78</sup> Both reports touch on Eiva’s mysterious spell behind bars, elucidating that he “spent two months in jail in Pakistan supposedly due to a mix-up by the Pakistani authorities.” It just so happened that

the jail also held Soviet soldiers captured in Afghanistan. Eiva attempted to instill anti-Soviet attitudes in them and convince them not to return to their Motherland. He paid particular attention to Lithuanian POW Rimas Burba, but Burba did not fall for the provocation and with the assistance of the Swiss ‘Red Cross’ returned [home] to Lithuania.<sup>79</sup>

The second report elaborates, asserting that during one of Eiva’s trips to the region in 1982 “he ostensibly fell under arrest in Peshawar and spent 78 days in a local prison.” Eiva publicly explains his internment, this account declares with his stated reasons set off by quotation marks, as “due to ‘the dissatisfaction of CIA staffers for his [Eiva’s] interference in their sphere of activities’” and “also ‘concern on the part of Pakistan’s Generals regarding his [Eiva’s] mission since they [the Generals] are trying by any means possible to hide the fact that a huge part of the financial and military assistance from the US intended for the Afghan counterrevolutionaries winds up in their own hands.’”<sup>80</sup> This KGB analyst, however, rejects Eiva’s version of his arrest

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<sup>77</sup> LSA, K-35-2-456, l. 314.

<sup>78</sup> LSA, K-35-2-456, l. 315; and LSA, K-35-2-456, l. 323. One report notes that “Eiva repeatedly travels to Pakistan,” adding that “he personally knows and holds close ties with the leaders of the seven basic Afghan counterrevolutionary groups.” LSA, K-35-2-456, l. 322.

<sup>79</sup> LSA, K-35-2-456, l. 316.

<sup>80</sup> LSA, K-35-2-456, ll. 322-323.

because “while in prison he was held alongside Soviet POWs, becoming acquainted with Rimas Burba from Druskininkaia, [Lithuania],” who “ostensibly with Eiva’s assistance” convinced the Afghans to transfer “the group of Soviet prisoners, including Burba himself, to representatives of the International Red Cross, promising that the entire group would ask for political refugee status/exile in the West.” These factors, the report concludes, “lead one to suggest that the goal of his prison stint was a provocation-recruiting process among the Soviet POWs being held there.”<sup>81</sup>

This second, lengthier report reads like a translation of one of Eiva’s FAAA newsletters, although not one of those available for this study. It asserts that, “as confirmed by Eiva,” the FAAA “managed in 1986 to remove Deputy Director of the CIA John McMahon” due to his “insufficiently active position on the Afghan question.” It lists as bullet points (a format commonly used by Eiva in his newsletter) the organization’s goals for 1987, including continuing their “campaign against the CIA and government bureaucrats because the funds allocated by Congress to Afghan ‘resistance groups’ were actually used to enrich members of the CIA and the Pakistani military”; creating an “air bridge” to supply weapons directly to the “resistance groups”; and achieving “an increase in the supply of Stinger Rockets from 20 to 150 per month.” This KGB report assesses Eiva’s overarching goal, “judging by publications in the American press,” as hoping “to bring about an investigation of the CIA’s spending of funds allocated by Congress as aid to the Afghan enemies (*dushmanov*)” while also looking to increase “the volume of that aid through increased allocations by Congress and by volunteer American donors.” According to “several American observers,” moreover, “this campaign could lead to a new scandal far larger in scale than ‘Iran-contra gate.’” The account concludes that “in our opinion, Eiva’s past and the character of his current activities leave no doubt that he belongs to

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<sup>81</sup> LSA, K-35-2-456, l. 323.

one of the spy organizations (*spetsssluzhba*) of the USA” and that “the current direction of Eiva’s activities and those of the organizations he leads (criticism of the State Department and CIA) may indicate that he works for one of the spy agencies (*spetspodrazdelenii*) in the Pentagon.”<sup>82</sup>

## Cold War Worldviews

“Why,” Eiva asked the Republican National Security Subcommittee, “has our country, conceived in insurgency, been so ineffective in supporting other men’s struggles to be free?” An image in the top left-hand corner of the FAAA’s newsletter portrays an American Revolutionary “Minute Man” with a musket standing alongside an Afghan rebel aiming a machine gun, thereby linking the Afghan struggle directly to a successful fight for freedom—that of the United States itself, with all of its obvious patriotic appeal to an American audience. The connection is clear: Afghan rebels fight for their liberation from foreign occupation just as Americans once did. “For the Soviets,” Eiva told the GOP Subcommittee, “to be the champions of those fighting for their liberation while we end up on the side of oppressive regimes”—an interesting concession by Eiva—“is one of history’s tragic ironies, especially when it is our belief in human rights and the dignity of man that distinguishes us from the Soviets.”<sup>83</sup> He expressed amazement that the mujahedeen has held out “for four brutal years against the murderous rage



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Image on Eiva’s FAAA newsletter.

<sup>82</sup> LSA, K-35-2-456, ll. 322-25. Colonel Ye. K. Elentsev authored this report.

<sup>83</sup> “Remarks of Andrew Eiva,” 3.

of a totalitarian technological superpower that has reduced the rape of the human spirit to a banal bureaucratic science that it practices against its own people as well as those abroad.”<sup>84</sup>

Eiva is adamant about one thing underlying (defining) his worldview: that US support for anti-communist guerilla movements in the post-World War II period has failed miserably due to bureaucratic shortsightedness and incompetence—bureaucratism—which he puts at the feet of (primarily) the CIA. He repeats this theme often, hammering it home to his 1984 Republican audience: “the United States,” he asserts, “has supported twelve arguably legitimate liberation movements since World War II: Albania, Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine, China, Sumatra, Tibet, Kurdistan (twice), Cuba, the Hmuong [sic] tribe in Laos, and Angola. All twelve have lost.”<sup>85</sup> Due to the “current bureaucratic performance in Afghanistan,” he continues, it is on its way to becoming number thirteen “unless immediate drastic corrective action takes place.” Eiva provides no details about the twelve failed “liberation movements” he frequently mentions so there is no clear sense as to who was fighting against whom or whether or not, for instance, anti-colonial nationalist struggles or, perhaps, US economic interests (masked under a broadly-defined “national security” agenda) figured into the equation at all.

Eiva’s parameters for what constitutes “legitimate liberation movements,” in other words, are not at all clear, especially as he qualifies the point by prefacing the phrase with “arguably,” acknowledging thereby the ambiguity of the ground he stands on. To be sure his intended audience, both at the 1984 GOP meeting and for the lobbyist material he disseminated over the years, would have agreed with and unflinchingly accepted his underlying ideological premise that “our” [US/American] “belief in human rights” and “the dignity of man” “distinguishes us

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<sup>84</sup> “Remarks of Andrew Eiva,” 8.

<sup>85</sup> “Remarks of Andrew Eiva,” 1. Gelb notes that “[Eiva] counts the score of American support for liberation movements since World War II ‘as 0 to 12, with Afghanistan as lucky 13,’” listing all examples as Eiva does in the speech. Gelb, “From One Kind of Army to Another.”

from the Soviets.” This illustrates the ideological dissonance of the Cold War because a “true believer” Soviet mentality, including most of the KGB apparatus, constructed the Cold War world ideologically in precisely the opposite terms, with the US and its Western allies as oppressor imperialists (“counterrevolutionaries”—including Eiva himself, as we have seen) and the Soviets as defenders of the world’s exploited masses (a point conceded by Eiva).

For Eiva bureaucratism was clearly the main hindrance to overcoming Soviet-supported oppression around the world. He explained to GOP foreign-policy makers that “bureaucrats in the CIA’s top echelons as well as the Pentagon’s top brass have always viewed the support of liberation movements as a distasteful diversion from their primary empire building activities” and thus do not provide financial support for guerrilla movements.<sup>86</sup> “Bureaucrats” in general, furthermore, tend to “favor the status quo,” while, Eiva asserts, the portion of the CIA tasked with supporting guerrilla warfare, the Directorate of Operations, suffers from a particular form of “bureaucratic malaise” rooted in its “ability to maintain a thicker curtain of secrecy over its shenanigans.”<sup>87</sup> Eiva also claims that if a CIA officer tries to improve the situation from within the agency (the belly of the bureaucratic beast so to speak), he faces “the threat of destruction [sic] of his livelihood and systematic opprobrium by the intelligence community along with its establishment allies.”<sup>88</sup>

Aside from his attacks on bureaucratism, Eiva’s views also constitute a critique of “containment,” the bedrock of US Cold War policy, advocating a roll back of communism starting in Afghanistan. “America’s inability to support legitimate guerrilla movements since World War II,” he asserts, “represents de-facto unilateral disarmament in a capability that has

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<sup>86</sup> “Remarks of Andrew Eiva,” 4.

<sup>87</sup> “Remarks of Andrew Eiva,” 4-5.

<sup>88</sup> “Remarks of Andrew Eiva,” 5.



accounted for most of the world's turf changes."<sup>89</sup> In other words, the third world is the major Cold War battleground (with Afghanistan front and center), and the US is losing that battle ("turf changes" referring to countries once friendly to the US becoming Soviet allies). Vietnam was clearly a major formative experience for Eiva. He did not fight in the conflict but drew significant lessons from it nonetheless: "I decided [after Vietnam] that the triumph of liberty could only be assured by offensive, not defensive actions, and I set out to figure out how to make it work, technically, strategically, and politically."<sup>90</sup> Eiva's depiction of Vietnam as a "no-win defensive scenario" speaks to US concerns about inciting the USSR or China into a deeper conflict in Southeast Asia. Similarly, US hesitation in supporting the mujahedeen more openly stemmed from worries of provoking the Soviets militarily, and thus Eiva's critique of US policy in Afghanistan further illustrates his advocacy of a roll-back mentality.

Eiva's worldview, however, rests on a very dubious (fundamentally flawed) premise: if bureaucratic incompetence dooms US Cold War policy in the Third World, then presumably had the US supported the twelve guerrilla movements he lists competently and sufficiently they could have succeeded and won (without, in the process, sparking World War III). Obviously he does not include Vietnam as one of the twelve, which would complicate his concept of "liberation movements" immensely. However, as noted he describes US conduct of the war in Vietnam as a "no-win defensive war," suggesting that the US needed to carry out a more aggressive ("offensive") military strategy (and that it may have worked). The Vietnam War, however, was not so much a "no-win defensive war" as it was an *unwinnable* war (as was Afghanistan for the Soviets), which exposes the basic flaw in Eiva's thinking.<sup>91</sup>

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<sup>89</sup> "Remarks of Andrew Eiva," 1.

<sup>90</sup> "Remarks of Andrew Eiva," 2.

<sup>91</sup> For a sampling of arguments about the Vietnam War being unwinnable see Fredrik Logevall, *Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and the Escalation of War in Vietnam* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1999);

The final KGB report about Eiva while the war still raged, dated February 1988 amid peace talks at Geneva, illustrates the KGB's ideologically-informed interpretation of Eiva's views. The report conveys Eiva's concerns with the negotiations, which ended with an agreement in April calling for a phased withdrawal of Soviet troops between May 1988 and February 1989, revealing a convergence of views between Eiva and the KGB—suddenly (and oddly) they are on the same page regarding the conflict, by then in its eighth year. Marked “secret” and authored by the new chief of Lithuania's branch of the KGB, Eduardas Eisemuntas, the memo, intended for two leading KGB officials in Moscow, elucidates Eiva's assessment of “the Afghan problem.”<sup>92</sup> “As [Eiva] stated in a confidential conversation,” the report begins, “the Soviet offer to bring an end to the Afghan conflict through political means so far has not found adequate support among representatives of the [Reagan] administration except for a few figures in the State Department who suggest limiting support for the ‘Afghan partisans’ [*afganskim partisanam*].”<sup>93</sup> It is not clear how the KGB gained access to a “confidential conversation” with Eiva. Did they tap his telephone and/or bug his office, or did Eiva convey his views to one of the KGB's “deeply-embedded sources” charged with “studying” him? Regardless, clearly Eiva's assessment at this point in the conflict coincides with that of the Soviets, so they merely convey his opinions without critiquing them. “The possibility of heightened military activities by the ‘Afghan rebels’ [*afganskikh povstantsev*],” the KGB reports Eiva saying, “could seriously complicate the question of the Soviet army's withdrawal, so it is necessary to reject an increase in US assistance to the ‘partisan formations’ [*partizanskim*

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David L. Anderson and John Ernst, *The War That Never Ends: New Perspectives on the Vietnam War* (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2007); and Lien-Hang T. Nguyen, *Hanoi's War: An International History of the War for Peace in Vietnam* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012).

<sup>92</sup> LSA, K-35-2-74, l. 36. The memo is for Victor Mikhailovich Vladimirov, First Chief Directorate of Foreign Operations, and Vladimir Mikhailovich Khrenov, Second Chief Directorate.

<sup>93</sup> LSA, K-35-2-74, l. 36.

*formirovaniiam*].” “In Eiva’s opinion,” the report continues, “Afghanistan will be able to be ‘truly free’ [*deistvetel’no svobodnyim*] in no sooner than three years. He has no doubts that the current leaders of the ‘liberating partisan movement’ [*osvoboditel’nogo partisanskoro dvizheniia*] will rule the country.”<sup>94</sup>

This KGB report sets several phrases—apparently direct quotes from Eiva in his “confidential conversation”—off with quotation marks that clearly point to the differing ideological perspectives of this final Cold War battleground. The report delineates the terms Eiva uses to describe the mujahedeen, “Afghan partisans,” “rebels,” “partisan formations,” and “liberating partisan movement,” but unlike a previous report linking Eiva to “counter-revolutionaries” this one does not challenge the views he puts forward. According to this KGB account, furthermore, Eiva foresaw “the ‘pacification’ of Pakistan” after the conflict ended to be “a complicated issue” because “Islamabad,” he explains with another phrase set off in quotation marks, “receives from the US ‘for assistance to the Afghan patriots’ [*afganskim patriotam*] huge financial means, weapons and spare parts, a significant chunk of which stays in Pakistan.”<sup>95</sup> Eiva also reportedly dismissed as “unrealistic” claims that Afghanistan’s former monarch, Zahir Shah, ousted in a 1973 coup and living in exile in Italy ever since, might return to lead a “transitional government,” or fears that a “regime of ayatollahs” may take over in the country.<sup>96</sup> The idea of a “regime of ayatollahs,” a term conjuring up fears of Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution, in Afghanistan seems unlikely given that ayatollahs are associated with the Shi’a branch of Islam and Afghanistan is a predominantly Sunni Muslim country. However, as we know in hindsight, Sunni extremists eventually prevailed from the chaos of Afghanistan, first in the form of the mujahedeen leadership (as Eiva predicted) during the civil war in the early 1990s

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<sup>94</sup> LSA, K-35-2-74, l. 37.

<sup>95</sup> LSA, K-35-2-74, l. 36.

<sup>96</sup> LSA, K-35-2-74, l. 37.

and then with the rise of the Taliban in the mid-1990s. This is the only discussion of a post-war Afghanistan in any of the materials examined for this study and it is in Eiva's words recorded by the KGB unchallenged and without commentary. Eiva opposes continued weapons supplies to the Afghan rebels amid the ongoing peace talks, which puts his view in line with that of the Soviets, while the KGB apparently takes his estimation of the conflict at this stage at face value (and also quite seriously).

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Andrew Eiva, a proponent of “rolling back” communism rather than just “containing” it, unquestionably played a key role in shaping US policy in Afghanistan through tireless behind-the-scenes lobbying for increased funding and supplies to be sent to the Afghan rebels, pushing the Tsongas Resolution through Congress, replacing reticent (from Eiva's point of view) bureaucrats like the CIA's John McMahon, etc. His role, moreover, to date unappreciated by Cold War scholars, illuminates the ideological backdrop of the late Cold War era as seen through Eiva's background, activities, and worldview—based on an analysis of his lobbyist materials—and also as perceived and interpreted by the KGB in their reports about him. Both sides definitely reduce “the complexities of a particular slice of reality,” in this case the Soviet-Afghan War, to “easily comprehensible terms” based on “an interrelated set of convictions or assumptions” that suggest “appropriate ways of dealing with that reality.”<sup>97</sup> Eiva, for instance, born quite directly into the Cold War fray as the son of Lithuanian refugees fleeing Soviet communism and influenced by the ghost of his grandfather, saw the mujahedeen's cause as synonymous with America's struggle for “liberty” against British colonial rule. He believed the Soviet Union to be a “totalitarian technological superpower” guilty of “raping the human spirit”

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<sup>97</sup> Hunt, *Ideology and US Foreign Policy*, xi.

and was determined to overcome the perceived “bureaucratism” in the CIA (of which McMahon was the personification), the cause of twelve failed anti-communist guerrilla campaigns since World War II. The fact that the Soviets championed those fighting for liberation around the globe—a significant admission by Eiva—was for him a “tragic irony” given the US belief in “human rights” and “the dignity of man,” which presumes that the Soviets did not believe in these concepts as well, albeit from their own very different ideological perspective.

The Soviets indeed saw the world through their own ideologically-determined (red-tinted) glasses. For them, “independent” (as in interwar Lithuania) equals “bourgeois” while the “so-called” Afghan “freedom fighters” touted by Eiva for trying to liberate their country from Soviet “occupation” were, in fact, “counterrevolutionaries,” “bands of enemies,” “resistance groups” fighting against the “legal [communist] government of that country.” Clearly one person’s “counterrevolutionary” is another person’s “freedom fighter,” depending of course on their ideological perspective. The frequent use of the term “ostensibly” in the KGB’s reports, moreover, casts doubt on Eiva’s assertions, exposing an awareness on the KGB’s part that they are interpreting an image of Eiva projected by himself and thus (at least in their eyes) not entirely reliable. Initially the KGB assumes that Eiva “has ties with the CIA” but eventually, due no doubt to his unrelenting criticisms of that agency, concludes instead that his “past and the character of his current activities leave no doubt” that he works for US military intelligence “led by the Pentagon.” The possibility of someone doing what Eiva was doing out of sheer ideological conviction and without the backing of higher authorities seems incomprehensible to the KGB and, in fact, a private citizen could *not* have operated the way that Eiva did within the Soviet system. Thus while the vague underlying ideological assumptions of “freedom” and “liberty” spouted by Eiva and his ilk in the West may have been superficial and oversimplified,

citizens on the US/Western side of the Cold War divide clearly were more free in relative terms than were their Soviet counterparts, which may at least in part explain why the Cold War ended the way that it did, i.e. with the collapse of the Soviet empire and de facto “victory” of the US/West.

The KGB’s reports, moreover, commonly set Eiva’s phrases and terms off with quotation marks if their authors do not agree with the ideological shorthand being used, such as Eiva labeling the Afghan rebels “patriots,” “liberating partisan movement,” etc. The delineation of those and other phrases highlights the differing sets of interrelated convictions and assumptions underlying the two competing Cold War ideologies. Reinforcing this point is the fact that the reports do *not* delineate language describing the situation within their own ideological parameters, i.e. referring to the mujahedeen as “dushman” or “enemies,” as they often do. In addition, the KGB completely rejects Eiva’s version of his two-month internment in Pakistan, insisting instead that it was a “provocation” on his part, a “recruitment” effort to convince Soviet POWs to defect to the west. Their explanation on this point seems plausible, especially given Eiva’s own claim that he learned Russian from talking to POWs at this time, which, if one can take such a claim at face value, suggests that he must have spoken a great deal of Russian while imprisoned in Pakistan. Finally, the KGB seems to think (based on “several American observers”) that Eiva’s criticisms of the CIA and its inadequate effort to fund the mujahedeen could lead to a scandal “far worse” than the Iran-Contra Affair, although, of course, that prognosis proved inaccurate as such a scandal never materialized.

The realities of the Soviet-Afghan War were complex. The Soviets invaded Afghanistan in December 1979 to shore up a weak, unpopular communist regime, and the US responded by building up the mujahedeen—“holy warriors,” “freedom fighters,” or “counterrevolutionaries”

depending on one's ideological outlook—both Cold War superpowers leaving a legacy of conflict, suffering, and tragedy that the people of Afghanistan have yet to overcome. Beneath the simplistic rhetoric, ideological formulas, and catch phrases of the late Cold War era the conflict served as a cauldron for a *jihadist* ideology that has emerged in the global arena in the decades since. Eiva saw the Soviet-Afghan War one way, the KGB another, and the mujahedeen in still another, entirely different light. The Cold War combatants did not seem to have an eye to post-war Afghanistan, a topic that seldom arises as both Eiva and his KGB adversaries no doubt assume that their respective idea of either an “independent” or “socialist” country would prevail. Of course, no one has a crystal ball, but it appears that the ideological blinders of the late Cold War era limited the long-term vision of those involved on both sides of the divide. As Charles Cogan, the first CIA project leader for the Afghan program, put it in 1994 not long after the first attack on the World Trade Center, “the hypothesis that the mujahedeen would come to the United States and commit terrorist actions did not enter into our universe of thinking at the time” (of course the worst—by far—was yet to come).<sup>98</sup> Nor did superpower policy-makers fathom the decades of turmoil and warfare to come in Afghanistan. Driven by his ardently anti-communist worldview and true to his vow on that summer evening in Brockton, Massachusetts in 1953, Andrew Eiva *definitely* did his part to ensure the victory of the mujahedeen, thereby contributing to the fall of the Soviet empire. Afghanistan itself, however, unfortunately has yet to recover from the utter destruction visited upon it in the Cold War's last major military and ideological battleground.

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<sup>98</sup> Tim Weiner, “Blowback from the Afghan Battlefield,” *New York Times Magazine*, 13 March 1994, 53. Cited in John Prados, “Notes on the CIA's Secret War in Afghanistan,” *The Journal of American History* 89 (2002), 471.